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 　 As the Japanese government often pointed out when it established its military 
legislation, security assurance in Japan is deeply connected to a potential 
emergency on the Korean Peninsula.  There tends to be different views between 
what Japanese and Korean people think regarding this security assurance because 
each country prioritizes its own security and security policies, and it is therefore 
natural that different perspectives exist in each nation’s respective security stance. 
The House of Representatives and the Upper House in Japan established these 
security policies in order to effectively protect their people. 
 　 Since World War II, Japan and South Korea have maintained security by 
forming military alliances with the United States.  However, both Japan and South 
Korea have failed to form a strong military solidarity with each other and instead 
have maintained a passive system of sharing military information.  On the other 
hand, South Korea has shared military information with China, and tried to keep a 
balance between Japan, the United States, and China. 
 　 South Korea intends to avoid repeating the past because it experienced repeated 
invasions on its national sovereignty in the late nineteenth century.  It may 
therefore be difficult for Korea to fully repair its relationship with Japan unless 
both countries share the same historical recognition.  This is why, although they 
share many ideas regarding democratic values and liberalism, they have not fully 
cooperated in communicating and maintaining order in East Asia.  However, there 
was a huge turning point when the Japanese government acknowledged their 
involvement and responsibility regarding the issue of the comfort women and 
concluded an agreement in December 2015. 
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 　 Two elements that affect the security situation in Korea include changes in 
security-related issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War, and 
responses toward China’s economic growth.  South Korea has tried to improve its 
relationship with Russia and China, especially when attempting to alleviate 
military threats from North Korea.  Both Russia and China have partnerships with 
North Korea via economic exchange with China. 
 　 The conflict against North Korea means that it is important for South Korea to 
strengthen its relationships with surrounding nations.  This paper will analyze 
three issues: changes in the security policy surrounding the Korean Peninsula 
based on the two elements mentioned above; the security environment in East 
Asia; and ways of improving the situation. 
 1．Changes in National Security after the Cold War 
 　 After the Cold War, among the changes in security policy on the Korean 
Peninsula that have taken place, the most obvious one has been the weakening 
indirect triangle alliance between Japan and South Korea, maintained by the 
United States.  The United States has requested that Japan and South Korea 
improve their relationship with each other in several ways.  After Japan and South 
Korea reached an agreement regarding the comfort women issue on December 28, 
2015, the United States expected an improvement in relations between Japan and 
South Korea. 
 　 When the Cold War was almost over, the South Korean government developed 
more flexible diplomatic policies toward the communist bloc in order to reduce 
the tension that existed at the time.  The South Korean government wanted to 
remove the burden and anxiety of confronting communist countries, including 
North Korea.  With the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1992 
and the Soviet Union in 1990, South Korea increased trade with communist 
nations in order to improve its relationships with them.  As a result, the need for a 
bulwark against communist countries has been declining. 
 　 What does “national security” mean? Walter Lippmann defined national 
security as follows: A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its 
legitimate interests to avoid war, and if challenged, to maintain them by war.  It is 
important to have bargaining power to avoid war, but at the same time also 
important to have the ability to go to war.  And national security has the ability to 
maintain economic relations with the rest of the world based on reasonable terms; 
to preserve its nature, institution, and governance for disruption from outside; and 
to control its borders.1 
 　 Since the end of the Cold War, the tension between the two Koreas has 
 1.  Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 
1943), 5. 
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decreased slightly, but there are still military threats from North Korea.  South 
Korea has established economic stability through active economic exchanges with 
communist countries, and has tried to bring about political peace as a result.  In 
particular, they have the placed high expectations on trade with China. 
 　 The trade volume between South Korea and China at the time when diplomatic 
relations were first established in 1992 amounted to $6.4 billion; this reached 
$211.2 billion in 2016, which is 33 times larger.  In South Korea’s overall volume 
of trade, China accounted for 2.1 percent in 1990 and 25.1 percent in 2016. 
Recently, representatives from both countries have forged stronger ties.  China has 
been South Korea’s largest trading partner since 2004.  South Korea is China’s 
fourth-largest trading partner. 
 　 On the other hand, the relationship between South Korea and North Korea has 
turned critical after maintaining a kind of pseudo-peace since the Korean War. 
The battle on the west coast between North Korea and South Korea in November 
2009, the sinking of the  Cheonan in March 2010, and the North’s shelling of 
Yeongpyeongdo in the same year resulted in the collapse of mutual trust.  These 
military confrontations resulted in South Korea strengthening their policies against 
North Korea with increased military power.2 
 　 One of the main reasons for the increasing tension on the Korean Peninsula is 
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.  North Korea conducted its first 
nuclear test in 2006 and the second in May 2009.  In the following month, The 
United Nations Security Council condemned the 25 May 2009 nuclear test by 
North Korea and tightened sanctions against it by blocking funding for nuclear, 
missile and proliferation activities through targeted sanctions on additional goods, 
persons and entities, widening the ban on arms imports-exports by Security 
Council Resolution 1874.3  North Korea’s armed provocation was intended to 
paralyze the UN’s decision by taking the stance of a country armed with nuclear 
power. 
 　 Even though the relationship between South Korea and North Korea is 
maintained by dialogue, albeit under enormous tension, South Korea has tried to 
continue trading in the limited North Korean economy and has expressed the 
intention to cooperate with North Korea, as both sides fully realize the 
catastrophic damage that would occur if a war was to break out. 
 　 Economic cooperation has been seen in the Kaesong Industrial Region and 
tours to Mt. Geumgang.  Tours to Geumgangsan have remained closed since a 
tourist died there in July 2008.  Therefore, the Kaesong Industrial Region has been 
recognized as a symbol of economic cooperation with the North.  Since 2011, 
products made in the Kaesong Industrial Region have accounted for more than 99 
 2.  Kim Kwangwook, “Security and Count-terrorism in South Korea,” in Hikaku 
Anzenhosyou [Compararive National Security], (Tokyo: Seibundo, 2013), 227. 
 3.  https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm. 
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percent of the trade between the two countries.  In May 24, 2010, following the 
sinking of the Cheonan ship in March 2010, trade between the two Koreas was 
limited to the Kaesong Industrial Region by South Korea’s response.  Afterward, 
the Lee Myung Bak administration no longer wanted to expand or make new 
investments in the Kaesong Industrial Region and took sanctions against North 
Korea.  Following this negative policy, he approved of only limited regions for 
trade, including Kaesong Industrial Region.  Because of this, trade with the North 
has become extremely limited.  Opposition parties, civic groups, and businesses 
have opposed economic sanctions against North Korea. 
 　 The scale of intra-Korean trade depends on the inter-Korean political and 
economic situation, which is strongly influenced by international economic 
sanctions imposed on North Korea following their nuclear weapons tests.  After 
the third nuclear weapon test was conducted in 2013, intra-Korean trade decreased 
from $197 million in 2012 to $113 million in 2013.  This trade recovered in 2014 
and 2015, but after the fourth nuclear weapon test in 2016, the scale of intra-
Korean trade decreased dramatically.4 
 　 With regard to the Six-Party Talks, China and Russia supported North Korea’s 
position.  However, Japan, the U.S., and South Korea insisted that North Korea 
stop their nuclear program and invite IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 
inspectors to monitor the suspension.  Japan, the U.S., and South Korea made it a 
prerequisite for North Korea to observe the agreement between the U.S. and North 
Korea, which was made on February 29, 2012.  Failure to observe the agreement 
would lead to mistrust between the two Koreas and the U.S. and North Korea, and 
would hinder the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. 
 2．Political and Economic Cooperation between China and South Korea 
 　 In Beijing in November 2014, trade ministers from China and South Korea 
signed the China-Republic of Korea FTA (free trade agreement).  Through 
fourteen rounds of negotiations, the two countries agreed to open their markets for 
products and services and created product-specific rules.  The trust shown by the 
two countries was an important factor in making this FTA.  The first negotiations 
were held in May 2012 following a private partnership agreement in 2004.  In 
Beijing on December 9, 2015, after thirty months of negotiations, the two 
countries exchanged a document confirming the validity of the FTA, and on 
December 20th, the China-Republic of Korea FTA became effective.  Through the 
FTA, South Korea can access domestic markets in China, its biggest and closest 
export market.  Specifically, owing to the FTA, customs duty on 958 export 
products amounting to $8.7 billion was abolished.  On top of this, customs duty 
 4.  Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), Comprehensive Assessment 
of North Korean Economy in 2016 and Prospects for 2017 (Sejong, Korea: KIET, 2017), 142. 
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 39 / 2017 75
on export products amounting to $45.8 billion will be abolished within ten years. 
The agreement is beneficial even for small Korean companies, who are able to 
find export partners in China.  Having experienced a trade deficit in its trade with 
South Korea, China expects to strengthen its international and political position in 
East Asia first before gaining economic benefits.5 
 　 The South Korean government considered the following extra economic 
factors in the agreement with China: the establishment of a mutual strategic 
cooperative relationship through the exchange of personal and material resources; 
a deepening of the relationship between the two countries; and help in bringing 
about peace and security in East Asia.  This agreement will work positively for the 
unification of the Korean Peninsula, and will be significant for regional economic 
cooperation such as the FTA between South Korea, China, and Japan, the TPP 
(Trans-Pacific Partnership), RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership), FTAAP (Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific), and for regional 
integration in East Asia.6 
 　 The China-Republic of Korea FTA includes not only economic goals but also 
has both a political and social meaning.  South Korea does not consider the 
agreement biased toward China, because the Korea-U.S. FTA (officially: Free 
trade agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, 
also called KORUS FTA) was already effective ahead of the China-Korea FTA. 
After the KORUS FTA was signed, the China-Republic of Korea FTA was 
ratified, and so the China-Republic of Korea FTA will not alienate neighboring 
countries.7  Since China and South Korea aim to make a China-Japan-South Korea 
FTA, the China-Republic of Korea FTA will not alienate Japan. 
 　 The Japanese government places strategic priority of its general policy for the 
Free Trade Agreement on its practical possibilities as well as economic, regional, 
political, and diplomatic factors.  They also see the possibility of establishing an 
FTA with China for economic cooperation in East Asia based on Japan, China, 
and South Korea, together with ASEAN.  Japan has seriously considered its trade 
policies with China following China’s fulfillment of the WTO agreement, the 
overall economic situation in China, its general relationship with China, and the 
intention of making the FTA within countries in Asia. 
 　 Referring to its relationship with South Korea, Japan has acknowledged South 
Korea as politically important for Japan since a favorable relationship was formed 
after they co-hosted the World Cup in May 2002, and the economic mutual 
dependence between the two countries was assured.  Financiers from both 
 5.  Yunling Zhang and Minghui Shen, The Status of East Asian Free Trade Agreements, 
ADBI Working Paper Series No.282, May 2011, Asian Development Bank Institute, 25. 
 6.  “S. Korea, China strike balance in FTA talks: gov’t,” Yonhap News, November 10, 
2014. 
 7.  Kim, Hikaku, 263 ― 64. 
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 39 / 201776
countries suggested that they would target a broad range of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) and FTA.8  There was a time when the possibility of making a 
Japan-South Korea FTA seemed higher than that of a Japan-China FTA, 
considering the close economic relationship of the two nations, the regional 
closeness, and the similarities in political structure.  However, there has been no 
effort to resume negotiations for a Japan-Korea FTA since negotiations broke up 
in 2004.  Since then, the trade environment surrounding the economy of East Asia 
has rapidly changed.  Extra obstacles such as historical recognition and territorial 
problems have emerged, along with the comfort women issue and compensation 
for forced labor during the Japanese colonial period.  Japan and Korea came to an 
agreement in December 2015 over the comfort women issue and created a chance 
to improve relations. 
 　 Both Japan and South Korea have tried to conclude FTAs with other countries 
since they failed in their negotiations for a Japan-Korea FTA.  South Korea has 
concluded FTAs with the U.S., EU, ASEAN, and India, while Japan has made 
agreements with each country in ASEAN, Mexico, and India.  There have been 
continuous negotiations to create a Japan-Korea FTA and a China-Japan FTA. 
However, whether these agreements will actually be concluded is unforeseeable.9 
The suspension of the Japan-China FTA and the Japan-Korea FTA has led to 
closer ties between China and South Korea and eventually the creation of the 
China-Republic of Korea FTA.  It is natural that China should make more effort in 
its diplomatic policies with South Korea rather than North Korea considering the 
increase in exchanges since 1992.  China expects its strong economic and political 
relationship with South Korea will eventually bring advantages in their 
relationship with the U.S.  This will also break the structure of the Cold War 
during which Japan, the U.S., and South Korea stood against North Korea, China, 
and Russia.  South Korea expects to maintain a balance in its relationship with the 
U.S. and China.  As long as China keeps a cooperative relationship with the U.S., 
this will not be a cause of stress for South Korea as they try to balance relations 
with China and the U.S.  However, if China and the U.S. confront each other, it 
will be a huge burden for South Korea politically and diplomatically. 
 　 On October 5, 2015, the TPP was completed at a Cabinet meeting in Atlanta, 
forming a larger economic bloc, taking up 40 percent of the volume of world 
trade.  The agreement will take effect only after getting approval from the 
parliaments of each respective country, and therefore it is difficult to predict the 
exact time and the exact amount of trade.  However, the TPP is expected to take 
 8.  Japan’s FTA Strategy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2002; see http://www.mofa.
go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/fta/summary.html. 
 9.  Kim Kwangwook, “National Security of Korean Peninsula,” in Asia under the Effects 
of Neoliberalism and Hegemonism, eds. Fuzita Kazuko and Mun Gyongsu (Kyoto: Minerva, 
2016), 46 ― 49. 
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effect even if the ratification process of some of the participating countries is 
delayed. 
 　 The TPP is meaningful in the sense that Japan and the U.S. set a solid 
foundation to take leadership in economic negotiations on investment, intellectual 
property, the environment, and labor as well as trade in the Pacific region.  Japan 
joined it in July 2013.  The TPP proposal was signed on February 4, 2016, in New 
Zealand, and is currently awaiting ratification.  On November 20, 2016, Singapore 
declared that they would amend legislation to bring the TPP into effect.  But the 
next day, on November 21, 2016, the U.S. President-elect, Donald Trump, 
announced that he planned to withdraw the United States from the TPP when he 
took office, and on January 23, 2017, President Trump signed a presidential 
memorandum to withdraw from the TPP. 
 　 When the TPP becomes effective, it is expected to cause changes not only in 
trade or the economy but also in international relationships and security.  The TPP 
could hold in check the economic powers centered on China and support the Asia 
Pacific countries to join agreement.  Thanks to the TPP, the political and economic 
order centered on China could be influenced by the direction and goals of the Asia 
Pacific countries that are centered on Japan and the United States.  However, since 
China is also included as a negotiating member of the TPP, it is not easy for Japan 
and the U.S. to hold back China.  For this reason, how China and Korea can be 
involved in the TPP is considered important. 
 　 At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial Meeting in November 
2014 hosted by China, the President Xi Jinping presented China’s economic plans. 
The areas affected by these plans include the belt areas from the center of China 
to the west, the west-south, and the south; many areas involved in the TPP are not 
included.  Besides, for the RCEP, the plan is to add six countries―Japan, China, 
South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand―to the ten countries of ASEAN. 
In the future, when the RCEP takes effect, it will be beneficial for the TPP. 
 3．The Security Dilemma between China and the United States 
 　 In general, a security dilemma indicates a case in which a country pursuing its 
own security confronts a dangerous situation even though it tries to protect itself. 
This can be explained as a paradox of security.  The paradox of security includes 
the following two dilemmas.  The first is an interpretative issue that cannot be 
explained: whether or not actions from other countries are made defensively or 
offensively.  The second is the dilemma of response: when a political leader has 
two choices, whether to resort to military action against an opposing country or 
pursue policies toward the opposing party based on trust.  The security dilemma 
of the U.S. and China reveals conflicts and military tensions.  With the territorial 
problems surrounding the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the U.S. is 
involved in conflicts between China and its neighboring countries, and this has 
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produced more complexity from the Chinese side.  The U.S. and China also try to 
secure mutual profits while maintaining close economic relationships. 
 　 China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC) often clash over who has territorial rights to 
the South China Sea, within what is known as the nine-dash line.  The territorial 
disputes made over the South China Sea include Indonesia over the Natuna 
Islands, and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and Vietnam over the Spratly 
Islands and Parcel Islands.  The U.S. has emphasized the importance of freedom 
of the seas and the peaceful resolution of the disputes over territorial sovereignty. 
 　 The PRC argues that the U.S. infringes upon the sovereignty and security of 
China for the freedom of the seas.  In July 2016, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea ruled against China’s maritime claims in China versus the 
Philippines.  China did not accept the rules and insisted that any resolutions 
should be made through bilateral negotiations.  The ROK opposed China’s 
military acts in the South China Sea that ignored international law. 
 　 Could China as a rising power threaten to displace the U.S. as the ruling power 
in East Asia? The U.S. share of global economic output fell from 22 percent in 
1980 to 16 percent today, while China’s grew from 2 percent to 18 percent over 
the same period.  Historians know that when a rising power threatens to displace a 
ruling power, alarms should sound extreme danger ahead.10 
 　 The U.S. has continued to conduct surveillance on China by watching the 
territorial disputes over the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and also North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.  Is it possible to manage the structural 
stresses between a rising and a ruling power without war? 
 　 China has already become the leading voice in Asia instead of the U.S.  The 
security dilemma between China and the U.S. appears to be cautious at this point. 
Regional institutions, including unorganized international meetings, in Asia since 
the millennium are as follows: 2001 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
2003 Six-Party Talks (SPT), 2005 East Asia Summit (EAS), 2010 Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), 2012 (RCEP).11 
 　 Even though the possibility of war in East Asia has decreased, daily life is 
threatened by problems of cyberterror, energy security, and climate change. 
 　 Cyberwar is typically conceptualized as state-on-state action equivalent to an 
armed attack or use of force in cyberspace that may trigger a military response 
with a proportional kinetic use of force.  Cyberterrorism can be considered “the 
premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers 
or networks, with the intention to cause harm or further social, ideological, 
religious, political or similar objectives, or to intimidate any persons in furtherance 
 10.  Graham Allison, “How Trump and China’s Xi could stumble into war,” The Washington 
Post, March 31, 2016, 35. 
 11.  Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origin of the American Alliance System in Asia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 211 ― 13. 
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of such objectives.”12  Cybercrime includes unauthorized network breaches and 
theft of intellectual property and other data; it can be financially motivated, and 
the response is typically under the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies. 
Within each of these categories, different motivations as well as the overlapping 
intent and methods of various actors can complicate response options. 
 　 Cyberterror is destructive even if not done with a political motive.  With the 
development of the internet society, a vast amount of data has been electronically 
stored for military, communications, and financial use.  This cyberterror has been 
notably increasing, and includes hacking, the theft and destruction of data, virus 
attacks through emails or browsers, and the destruction of networks. 
 　 In Japan, China, and Korea, a large number of people use the internet, and 
preparation for potential cyberattacks is essential, especially as modern society 
depends on computer systems for electricity, communication, gas, and water as 
well as for logistics such as transportation, finance, and distribution. 
 　 President Xi Jinping discussed these problems with President Obama when he 
visited the United States.  At a press conference on September 25, 2015, both 
leaders announced that they would not permit cyberterror, especially attacks on 
intellectual property of businesses. 
 　 The National Security Advisor at the time, Susan Rice, visited China in August 
2015, and suggested sanctions―in this case the freezing of assets―against 
twenty-five Chinese companies suspected of cyberattacks.  This became an 
important agreement between China and the U.S. with regard to cyber disputes.13 
 　 During the Cold War, China had a better understanding of the U.S. and 
improved their relationship by changing their diplomatic behavior, which resulted 
in isolating the former Soviet Union and finished the Cold War.  After the end of 
the Cold War, South Korea established diplomatic relations with China and has 
tried to keep a security balance between the U.S. and China, with its increasing 
military power buoyed by economic development. 
 　 A recent example of this can be shown in the diplomatic disputes on THAAD 
(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missile) deployment.  The Park Geun-Hye 
Administration was extremely cautious about the deployment of THAAD, and 
expressed a policy of No Request, No Consultation, and No Decision because 
deployment is an issue related to the security dilemma between the United States 
and China.  THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile system developed by the U.S. 
army.  While Korea takes a cautious stance toward THAAD, there have been 
disputes between the U.S. and China with regard to their deployment. 
 　 A question has been raised continuously from China as to the strategic 
 12.  Catherine A. Theohary and John W. Rollins, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism: In 
Brief, Congressional Research Service, March 27, 2015, 2. 
 13.  “U.S. developing sanctions against China over cyberthefts,” The Washington Post, 
August 30, 2015. 
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significance of the deployment of THAAD in South Korea.  Although it is 
strategically effective, there is a concern that the South Korean government cannot 
afford it.  The United States emphasizes the effectiveness and adequacy of 
THAAD deployment through various channels and stresses this as their policy. 
China also does not let its guard down when it comes to the deployment of 
THAAD. 
 　 There are two main reasons for China exerting pressure on South Korea’s 
deployment of THAAD.  First, considering South Korea’s domestic politics and 
the current situation in Northeast Asia, it is highly possible that China considers 
South Korea as the weakest link among the Northeast Asian allies of the United 
States, and in this context, believes it could weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance and 
possibly the wider alliance system.  Second, China seeks to prevent any changes 
to the current strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula, which could be brought 
about by changes in South Korea’s missile defense system.  North Korea’s 
continuing development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons has put South 
Korea at a strategic disadvantage.  South Korea is able to respond to this through 
the U.S.’s extended deterrence, but comparing the existing military strength on the 
Korean Peninsula, North Korea can be said to be in an asymmetrically beneficial 
position due to its missile and nuclear capabilities.  Therefore, any changes to 
South Korea’s defense capabilities to deter North Korea’s missiles would change 
the strategic situation in the region, which is highly undesirable for China.14 
 　 Regarding the deployment of THAAD, there is severe competition for 
supremacy in the East Asian region.  The U.S. is concerned that China’s economic 
growth could infringe upon U.S. interests in the East Asian region and could 
threaten U.S. military power in the region. 
 　 In July 2016, Seoul and Washington announced plans to deploy the THAAD 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in South Korea.  They just managed to 
reach an agreement regarding deployment in the latter days of Park’s presidential 
term.  South Korea and the United States Forces Korea have chosen Seongju 
County in North Gyeongsang Province as the site for the THAAD battery.15 
Earlier in her presidency, Park had cultivated a stronger strategic relationship with 
China partly in order to influence Beijing’s North Korea policy.  But with Chinese 
pressure failing to curb Pyongyang’s provocations, South Korea appeared to tilt 
toward U.S. wishes in joining its missile defense system.16 
 　 Moon and the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) have so far criticized the 
 14.  Woo Jungyeop and Eileen Block, “Misinformation Hinders Debate on THAAD 
Deployment in Korea,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, August 11, 2015; http://www.eastwestcenter.org/
publications/misinformation-hinders-debate-thaad-deployment-in-korea. 
 15.  The Korea Times, July 12, 2016. 
 16.  Coordinated by Mark E. Manyin, U.S.-South Korea Relations, Congressional Research 
Service, October 20, 2016. 
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former Park Geun-hye government’s rush to deploy the advanced missile defense 
system.  Since his inauguration as president, Moon has maintained an ambiguous 
stance on this issue, neither supporting the placement of the missiles nor sharing 
any plans to withdraw them.17  Moon suspended the deployment of THAAD, and 
the two launchers already installed can remain, but the other four launchers would 
not be set up until the administration has completed an environmental assessment. 
The delay of the deployment of THAAD is advantageous for China.  Many people 
in South Korea regard the delay of THAAD deployment in South Korea as one 
method to avoid the danger of war between South and North Korea for a while. 
 　 However, in response to North Korea’s test launch of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM), President Moon decided to complete the deployment of four 
THAAD missile launchers.  After North Korea’s sixth nuclear test on September 
3, 2017, South Korea decided to allow the United States Forces Korea (USFK) to 
carry out provisional construction work needed to operate the battery and bring 
the remaining four launchers to the site.18  It was an important decision for 
President Moon to make in managing negotiations between the U.S. and North 
Korea without any preemptive strikes from either side. 
 　 In 2015, President Obama insisted that a rebalance of Asia should not consist 
of a policy of blocking China, and mentioned that China could join the TPP. 
Through this, he tried to alleviate China’s excessive concern.  The U.S. policy 
toward China was also expressed in the summit talks with the South Korean 
president of the time, Park Geun-hye, on her trip to the U.S. in October 2015. 
President Obama mentioned that there was no contradiction in Korea having good 
relations with both China and the U.S., but he requested that Korea speak out if 
China should violate international rules.19  The request was that if there is conflict 
between the U.S. and China in the East Asian region, Korea should show its true 
colors. 
 　 So far, the U.S. goal is to develop a cooperative military system based on close 
ties with Japan and South Korea.  This includes the integration of an anti-missile 
defense system between the U.S. and South Korea, and the sharing of military 
information among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea.  The Japanese government 
takes an active role in these efforts by the U.S., but South Korea takes a passive 
attitude toward this issue, considering the feelings of China even if they are fully 
aware of the necessity for collective security. 
 　 In Japan, the pros and cons surrounding the issue of the U.S. military’s 
 17.  Charlie Campbell, “The Negotiator” TIME, May 15, 2017, 32 ― 35. 
 18.  “4 more THAAD launchers to be deployed Thursday,” The Korea Times, September 6, 
2017. 
 19.  “2015 United States-Republic of Korea Joint Statement on North Korea,” https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/united-states-republic-korea-joint-statement-
north-korea. 
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relocation within Okinawa are related to the U.S.-China security dilemma.  In 
May 2015, Okinawa Governor Onaga Takeshi visited the U.S. and asked them to 
reconsider the planned relocation of the U.S.  Marines’ air base at Futenma to the 
less populous Henoko region when he spoke with members of the Defense and 
State departments as well as members of Congress.  The U.S. made it clear that 
they would not go through with the renegotiations because they are based on an 
agreement made by both the U.S. and Japan.20 
 　 Not all of the heads of local governments in Okinawa agree with Onaga 
Takeshi.  Nakayama Yoshitaka, the mayor of Ishigaki, criticized him, saying that 
the head of a local government does not have diplomatic rights to criticize a 
national government.  Nakayama also pointed out that Onaga raised the question 
on the relocation of the U.S. military base without considering the fact that 
Chinese military ships continue to enter the waters around the Senkaku Islands. 
Nakayama blamed the Okinawa governor for disrupting the balance between the 
U.S. and China at a conference with leading members of the Chinese government 
during his visit to China in April.21  On October 13, Onaga revoked a permission 
that his predecessor, Nakaima Hirokazu, gave to the central government to reclaim 
land for the relocation.  Due to this, the central government suspended the 
withdrawal of the approval of landfill by executing administrative procedures.22 
The conflict between the national government and Okinawa Prefecture over the 
plan to relocate the U.S. base has developed into a legal battle. 
 　 The conflict surrounding the relocation of the U.S. military base represents a 
dilemma between the central government and Okinawa and a lack of consensus 
among local government leaders.  The relocation of the U.S. military base and the 
deployment of THAAD have something in common.  If a war breaks out because 
of the aggravation of the situation, Japan and Korea are highly likely to be the first 
to be attacked.  In July 2015, at a special committee of members of the House of 
Representatives regarding the Security Act, Ota Masahide, when questioned, 
testified that the Henoko base would be a target for attack.23 
 　 The current U.S.-China relationship is not a confrontational relationship like 
 20.  “Gov. Onaga to continue direct negotiation to stop new base,” Ryukyu Shimpo, June 5, 
2015. 
 21.  The Okinawa Times, June 4, 2015. 
 22.  Yomiuri Shimbun, September 14, 2015; Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 2015. 
 23.  Former Okinawa governor Ota Masahide expressed his opposition to the construction 
of a new military base in Henoko, Nago. Ota emphasized his refusal to accept the construction 
of new bases, stating that the Okinawan people’s opposition to the bases is grounded in their 
experiences of the battle of Okinawa. “At Okinawa witness hearing, two oppose security 
legislation; two support it but call for cautions deliberation,” Ryukyu Shimpo, July 6, 2015; 
Ota, the witness, stated that when a base is made in Henoko, it’ll be an aggressive mark. For 
details, see Minutes of the Special Committee of the 189th House of Representatives on Bills 
related with Security, July 8, 2015. 
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that of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.  Although the U.S. and 
China have opposing views in politics and national security, they have kept their 
interdependent economic relationship and exchange of human resources.24  They 
have taken both a competitive and a cooperative approach. 
 　 The U.S.-China dilemma can also be seen in the economy.  Although the AIIB 
(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and the ADB (Asian Development Bank) 
seem to be competitive, they are complementary and share work as international 
financial institutions.25  The cooperation and competition in U.S.-China relations 
have an influence on the Korean Peninsula.  This can be seen through the 
repetition of tension and reconciliation.  In other words, sometimes there is 
tension among these countries, but other times reconciliation. 
 4．One of the Most Isolated Countries in the World 
 　 The close relationship between North Korea and China can be described as 
“lips and teeth.” The Chinese people consider the Korean War as a war where the 
U.S. was their common enemy.  China’s involvement in the Korean War and the 
sacrifice of their soldiers is connected to the activity of Korean troops during the 
Chinese Civil War.  So the relationship between North Korea and China can be 
traced to before the WW II. 
 　 According to a survey in  World Policy Journal , the DPRK is one of the most 
isolated countries in the world.  The survey was conducted according to the 
following: 1) the number of countries directly connected by plane; 2) the 
percentage of individuals on the internet; 3) the number of foreign visitors; 4) the 
percentage of immigrants; and 5) imports per capita in dollars.26 
 　 China handles North Korea with kid gloves because it fears what would happen 
if the regime collapsed.  China regards stability on the Korean Peninsula as its 
primary interest.  Its support for North Korea ensures a friendly nation on its 
northeastern border and provides a buffer between China and the democratic 
South Korea.27 
 　 North Korea’s eventual reunification with South Korea might lead to it 
becoming a democratic U.S. ally with the potential for tens of thousands of U.S. 
and Korean troops to be stationed along China’s border.  Millions of Korean-
 24.  Kim Kwangwook, “Triangle confrontation between Japan, China and South Korea 
regarding to historical recognition,” in Kioku no kyouyu o mezasite [Aiming at the Sharing of a 
Memory], ed. Kawashima Masaki (Otsu: Kohro-sya, 2015), 248. 
 25.  Nathan Sheets, “Building a global infrastructure for growth,” CNBC, January 7, 2015; 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/07/building-a-global-infrastructure-for-growth-commentary.
html. 
 26.  World Policy Journal, Spring 2013, 22 ― 23. 
 27.  Beina Xu, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 
26, 2017; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship. 
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Chinese living in the border regions are one of China’s most stable ethnic 
minorities and they have not called for independence, but if the Korean Peninsula 
were unified, this could change.  This is part of the reason why China provides 
North Korea with presumably large amounts of aid as well as diplomatic cover at 
the United Nations.28 
 　 On September 3, 2015, President Park Geun-hye attended China’s war victory 
parade.  Park then visited the building that housed Korea’s provisional government 
in Shanghai during the colonial era.  The purpose of this visit was to attend its 
reopening ceremony.  At the request of the South Korean government, the Chinese 
government renovated the three-story building. 
 　 It is stated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, which was amended in 
1987, that the Republic of Korea originates from the provisional government in 
Shanghai.  We can assume that the fact that China has renovated the building that 
housed Korea’s provisional government in Shanghai means that China intends to 
improve its relationship with South Korea and has changed its relationship with 
North Korea, with whom they had kept friendly relations for a long time. 
 　 What does North Korea’s position imply in the relationship between the U.S. 
and China? Delegations of the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva in 1994 to negotiate an overall resolution of 
the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.  The U.S. called upon North Korea to 
freeze its development of nuclear weapons and stop the construction of nuclear 
reactors until the completion of a light water reactor.  In exchange for this, the 
agreement included supplying North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy oil 
annually.  This plan was meant to gradually repair the relationship between the 
U.S. and North Korea. 
 　 This agreement suffered a setback when North Korea admitted possessing a 
uranium-enrichment program in October 2002.  The Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) suspended oil shipments to North Korea, and 
the IAEA adopted a resolution criticizing North Korea’s uranium-enrichment 
program. 
 　 In April 2003, the United States, North Korea, and China held trilateral talks in 
Beijing to find a solution to the nuclear issue in North Korea.  The U.S., which did 
not have faith in North Korea, began to consider having neighboring countries 
participate in the negotiations.  In July 2003, the United States contacted North 
Korea in New York, which led to the Six-Party Talks that involved six countries, 
including Japan.  The Six-Party Talks have not been held since the third chief 
delegate talks at the sixth meeting in December 2008. 
 　 In January 2009, President Obama expressed his willingness to compromise 
with countries in conflict with each other.  However, North Korea launched a long 
 28.  Shen Dingli, “Lips and Teeth,” Foreign Policy, February 2013; http://foreignpolicy.
com/2013/02/13/lips-and-teeth/. 
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range Taepodong - 2 ballistic missile on April 5 and conducted its second 
underground nuclear test on May 2, which made the U.S. take a firmer stand.  In 
March 2010, the South Korean patrol ship  Cheonan was sunk near the South 
Korean-North Korean maritime border, and in November 2010, North Korea fired 
artillery rounds at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, which led to a 
worsening of the situation.  Disputes between Japan and China surrounding the 
Senkaku islands brought about U.S.-China conflict and lowered the chances of 
holding the Six-Party Talks. 
 　 In December 2011, following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, 
his son, Kim Jong-un, succeeded political power.  In February 2012, a high-level 
meeting between the United States and North Korea was held in Beijing.  They 
reached agreements that included suspending long-range missile tests, halting 
operations at the Yongbyon uranium enrichment plant, and inviting IAEA 
inspectors to monitor the suspension.  It was also made clear that the U.S. would 
provide North Korea with 240,000 metric tons of food.  All this opened up the 
possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks. 
 　 On April 3, 2012, North Korea stated that it had nuclear weapons and amended 
its Constitution.  In spite of U.S. opposition, North Korea attempted to launch a 
missile on April 13.  It launched a long-range missile on December 12 and carried 
out its third nuclear test, opposing UN sanctions, in February 2013. 
 　 After this third nuclear test, the UN Security Council decided to impose trade 
regulations against the North.  In March and April, North Korea warned that they 
would close the Kaesong Industrial Region because of joint military exercises 
conducted by the U.S. and South Korea.  In April, North Korea actually prohibited 
the access of workers from the South.  Even though it is beneficial for the North 
to activate the Kaesong Industrial Region, North Korea argued that they could 
utilize the Kaesong Industrial Region for political and military purposes. 
 　 North Korea then announced that they succeeded with a fourth nuclear test on 
January 6, 2016, and then on February 7 they launched a long range ballistic 
missile.  The reason why they have continued with these is because they would 
rather strengthen their current system than stop the sanctions imposed on them. 
On February 10, 2016, the South Korean government indefinitely suspended 
reopening the Kaesong Industrial Region, and on February 11, North Korea 
banished South Korean workers.  This shows that the operation of the Kaesong 
Industrial Region depends on the political and economic situation since it was 
closed once in 2013. 
 　 On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test and stated 
that this test had enabled them to confirm that its warheads could be mounted on 
missiles and verify the warhead’s power.  Each time North Korea conducted a 
nuclear weapons tests, the country was burdened with sanctions. 
 　 Following the fifth nuclear weapon test, the UN Security Council passed 
UNSCR (UN Security Council Resolution) 2321, added a resolution on human 
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rights, in November 2016.  UNSCR 2321 condemns the DPRK for pursuing 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people, and 
emphasizes the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and 
inherent dignity of people in the DPRK. 
 　 North Korea launched a missile and carried out a nuclear test in order to 
counteract the U.S.-South Korean joint military drills which had been held almost 
every year.  China and Russia have taken positions as mediators, and they have 
strongly opposed both the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and North 
Korea’s nuclear tests.  In January 2015, North Korea suggested that they could 
suspend nuclear tests only if the United States and South Korea stopped their 
annual joint military drills.  The United States rejected North Korea’s suggestion. 
In response to this, China criticized the U.S.’s rejection and defended the position 
of North Korea.  China seems to understand North Korea’s position but it makes 
North Korea feel cut off within the framework of “A New Type of Great Power 
Relationship”29  between the U.S. and China. 
 　 Cui Tiankai arrived in Washington, D.C., on April 2, 2013, to take up his new 
post as China’s ambassador to the United States and had an interview with 
 Foreign Affairs in which he insisted that they should find ways to work with each 
other rather than for China to confront with the preexisting great power, the U.S..30 
China’s intention is to be on an equal standing with the U.S. in pursuit of their 
economic profits.  China wants its opinion to be respected since they are 
competing with the U.S. in territorial problems in the East China Sea, and the 
South China Sea. 
 　 In its relationship with China, the U.S. expects both countries try to solve 
global problems responsibly and to behave appropriately, according to 
international laws.  The U.S. has been demanding that North Korea’s nuclear 
problem should be solved according to international laws or international 
standards, and has kept the line that Six-Party Talks or U.S.-North Korean talks 
must be preceded by South-North Korean talks on denuclearization and 
improvements in South-North Korean relations.  The U.S. expects China to 
comply with U.S. requests in order to protect its own interests.31 
 　 After North Korea announced that they had conducted a fourth nuclear 
weapons test, claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb for the first time on 
 29.  This quote, “A New Type of Great Power Relationship,” is taken from President 
Obama’s national security adviser, Tom Donilon, when he mentioned this to the vice chairman 
of the Central Military Commission, Gen. Fan Changlong when they met on May 28, 2013, in 
Beijing; “Chinese President to Seek New Relationship With U.S. in Talks,” The New York 
Times, May 28, 2013. 
 30.  Interview by Jonathan D. Tepperman, “Beijing’s Brand Ambassador: A Conversation 
With Cui Tiankai,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, http://jonathantepperman.com/beijings-
brand-ambassador-a-conversation-with-cui-tiankai. 
 31.  Mark E. Many-in, Congressional Research Service, 16. 
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January 6, 2016, China denounced North Korea immediately.  However, 
considering the position that China has taken every time North Korea has 
conducted nuclear tests, it is unlikely that China will take firm action on this 
matter. 
 　 China will suspend all imports of coal from North Korea until the end of the 
year 2017.  Coal is North Korea’s largest export item, and also China’s greatest 
point of leverage over the country.32 
 5．How Can We Overcome the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula? 
 　 North Korea has been put under stress to survive, regardless of international 
rule, including the presidential statements of UNSCR.  China will be in a better 
position to pressure North Korea into denuclearizing.  But there are limits to 
counting on China’s role, as China regards North Korea as a “buffer” between 
China and the democratic security alliance of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. 
North Korea has repeatedly called for a peace treaty to formally end the Korean 
War but the U.S. has been reluctant to respond to this proposal. 
 　 President Moon Jae-in was chief of staff to the former president Roh Moo-
hyun and a strong proponent of the Sunshine Policy.  Why could the Sunshine 
Policy not be sustained during the administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park 
Geun-hye? North Korea did not freeze nuclear development during the decade 
from 1998 to 2008 of the Sunshine Policy.  How can Moon negotiate an agenda in 
which North Korea has insisted that nuclear weapons are unnegotiable? 
 　 And what can we expect of South Korea’s bargaining power between the U.S. 
and North Korea? North Korea eagerly wants to be seen as a nuclear state, and 
wanted to sign a peace treaty instead of the armistice agreement in 1953.  The U.S. 
plans to talk with North Korea on prior agreement to dismantle North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile programs.  The U.S. has warned North Korea that all options 
are on the table, ranging from a military strike on North Korea to direct diplomatic 
talks. 
 　 If South Korea’s foreign policies were in conflict with a unification strategy, 
one of them would be ignored by the person in power.  President Moon wants to 
be in the driver’s seat when negotiating the problems on the Korean Peninsula 
with China and the U.S.  Why does President Moon need to be in the driver’s 
seat? The primary concern of nations surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including 
the U.S., is victory in a war against North Korea, but the primary concern for 
South Korea is to avoid the tragedy of fratricidal war.33 
 　 Generally speaking, opposition parties in South Korea tend to follow a 
 32.  “China halts import of coal from North Korea,” The New York Times (International 
Edition), February 20, 2017, 5. 
 33.  Philip Gordon, “A Vision of Trump at War,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2017, 19. 
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traditional foreign policy.  On the other hand, the ruling party and the progressive 
party tend to place a lot of value on the unification strategy.  Disagreements on 
foreign policy and the unification strategy of South Korea could result in poor 
relations within international society.  If South Korea were to adopt a policy of 
appeasement with North Korea, it would be suspected of betrayal with allies.  One 
feasible policy for South Korea would be to guarantee the survival of North 
Korea; that of the U.S. is to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program. 
 　 The security dilemma among Japan, China, and Korea receives attention 
because policies that strengthen national security may function in reverse.  In 
particular, the changes to international relations surrounding the Korean Peninsula 
are noticeable.  Recently, with regard to the deployment of THAAD, the South 
Korean government took its relations with the U.S. and China into consideration. 
Due to this, the relationship between Japan and Korea was undermined a little. 
 　 The reason why the Korean government has strengthened its relationship with 
China is because they are aware of the influence of China on North Korea, and 
they intend to create the unification of the Korean Peninsula initiated by the South 
Korean government.  Besides this, they consider that their relationship with China 
on a trade basis, as well as on an economic and security level, has increased. 
Collaboration with neighboring countries is necessary in order to prevent local 
wars on the Korean Peninsula and to bring about denuclearization in North Korea. 
 　 As shown during the Cold War, Japan and Korea had strengthened their 
solidarity in politics, military, and national security through aid from the United 
States.  However, the recent solidarity between China and South Korea has 
weakened the triangle security alliance among Japan, the U.S., and Korea.  By 
strengthening its political and economic association with South Korea, China has 
tried to block political and military pressure from the solidarity of Japan, the U.S., 
and South Korea. 
 　 In the process of passing Japan’s security laws, the concept of proactive 
pacifism, which was emphasized by the second Abe cabinet, means that it is 
necessary to react based on the principle of international cooperation, considering 
that Japan has faced important national issues to cope with various threats from 
North Korea.  Based on this concept, Japan emphasized the importance of making 
laws related to their national security.  The background of this situation is as 
follows.  After the Gulf War, the Japanese government sent the Self-Defense 
Forces to remove mines in the Persian Gulf.  The government provided over $13 
billion instead of taking military action, and Japan was harshly criticized 
internationally for its unfriendly manner.  Japanese troops halted their refueling 
mission in the Indian Ocean in November 2007 before the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law took effect.  But the U.S. and the UK criticized Japan for this. 
With the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law ratified in January 2008, Japan 
resumed its refueling mission, but felt the necessity of legislating a new law since 
the old law had been annulled in January 2010. 
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 　 Collective self-defense, which is included in Japan’s security laws, receives 
attention with regard to the overseas dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. 
Prime Minister Abe has given examples of occasions where overseas dispatch 
would be considered necessary based on collective self-defense.  They include a 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the South 
China Sea, which is Japan’s oil supply route.  This was also the area where the 
United States was involved in territorial disputes between China and other 
neighboring countries concerning the ownership of the Spratly Islands. 
 　 Among the disputes over ownership and free passage in the South China Sea, 
we can clearly see a security dilemma between the U.S. and China, and Japan may 
also be influenced by this dilemma. 
 　 In order to resolve these conflicts and to ease tension in the East Asian region, 
including on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, China, and Korea must develop close 
relations.  It is true that historical disputes and territorial problems have become 
heavy burdens on Japan’s foreign policy with China and Korea.  However, China 
and Korea are pushing forward to make the Korea-China-Japan FTA along with 
the China-Korea FTA.  Besides, China and Korea are also interested in joining the 
TPP, which is led by Japan. 
 　 In the keynote speech by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 
Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015 he insisted that the U.S. play an important 
military role for economic development, growth, and stabilization in Asia after 
World War II.  He made a serious request for informative models in Asia through 
U.S.-China cooperation by pointing out the transition of power and the 
competition between China and the U.S.  Concerns about China’s military action 
in the South China Sea are common interests of surrounding nations. 
 　 For Japan and Korea, security and freedom in the South China Sea are 
considered important since both countries have a high degree of trade dependence. 
How will the Japanese government and the Korean government collaborate and 
compete with China’s foreign policy? South Korea wishes to collaborate with 
Japan, the U.S., and China in order to bring peace in East Asia. 
 Conclusion 
 　 There has been tension and confrontation among Japan, China, and Korea due 
to historical issues and territorial problems.  Therefore the security issue, including 
nuclear weapon tests and missile tests in North Korea, needs to be solved in order 
to bring about cooperation among countries.  In particular, cooperation between 
the United States and China is essential to solve the North Korea nuclear problem. 
 　 Recently, since North Korea conducted nuclear tests and launched missiles, the 
world has seen the reappearance of the confrontation between Japan-U.S.-South 
Korea and China-Russia-North Korea from the Cold War era.  China accepted 
sanctions against North Korea according to the rules of the United Nations 
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Security Council and international society, but is also worried that sanctions on 
North Korea might result in a blockade of China which is centered on the U.S.’s 
rebalance policy in Asia.  This kind of concern can be seen in China’s policy of 
opposing a complete economic blockade of North Korea.  However, the U.S. 
considers that the nuclear weapons possessed by North Korea could harm the 
security of international society and has pushed for economic sanctions against 
North Korea, even considering regime change in North Korea.  In contrast, China 
considers peace important on the Korean Peninsula through the stabilization of 
systems in North Korea. 
 　 Each country’s opposition to North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile tests 
is built on a gap in recognition between international rules accepted as universal 
values and domestic-oriented defense for the survival of North Korea.  The bottom 
line of the UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea appears to be 
different depending on the various interpretations and applications of each 
country. 
 　 When South Korea pushes forward its unification policy along with its security 
policy, the discordance between these can influence international relationships. 
What makes the situation even more complicated is the priority between war and 
peace.  From the perspective of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea triangular alliance 
during the Cold War, the closeness of South Korea and China gives us an 
impression of it moving away from the structure of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea 
triangle alliance.  But a serious deterioration in relations between China and South 
Korea on the deployment of THAAD in South Korea has put paid to these 
misunderstandings.  The gap in recognition between China and South Korea 
concerning the deployment of THAAD started with security issues but has now 
morphed into various types of disputes on economic problems. 
 　 Continuous nuclear tests and missile launches by North Korea could make 
South Korea take a harder line such as long-term evacuation from the Kaesong 
Industrial Region and to reconsider their security policy.  However, President 
Moon makes a good excuse for the resumption of dialogue with North Korea. 
